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FRONTIER AGRICULTURE, FOOD SUPPLY, AND CONJUNCTURE: 
A REVOLUTION IN DURA ON ETHIOPIA'S MAZEGA 1898-1930 
By James C. McCann* 
African agricultural history has most often been seen as the sum of the day-to-day and 
season-to-season adjustments of farmers and pastoralists to environmental constraints or 
to new political and mercantile opportunities. Agricultural change is thus usually subtle, 
incremental, and often presented as a progressive, cumulative process. Occasionally, 
however, a set of historical conditions or actors precipitate rapid changes in productivity, 
technology, markets, or social organization, which are transient and the result of more 
conjunctural than incremental change. Between 1910 and 1920 the Mazega - a sparsely 
populated lowland "cotton soil" plain on Ethiopia's northwest frontier - underwent a 
dramatic, but heretofore unnoticed agricultural revolution, changing from a depopulated 
frontier to a major source of food supply for northeast Africa. This important regional 
phenomenon lasted a decade and then vanished with few traces. 
The topic of this study is a revolution in food production and the role of dura 
(sorghum vulgare) in an historical moment of a frontier region adjoining the border of 
northwest Ethiopia, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan's Kassala Province, and the southwestern 
marches of the Italian colony of Eritrea. While the most important recent studies of food 
in modern African history have focused on feeding the cities, this study focuses on food 
in a rustic, frontier environment which predates effective colonial intervention in its 
regional economy. The sources of this transformation lay not in the slow percolation of a 
new technology or cultigen but in a conjuncture of geography, demography, and the 
intersection of two historical epochs which preceded the emergence of mature colonial 
political economies in northeast Africa. The Mazega's brief agricultural revolution had its 
inspiration in the economic license of an open frontier before effective colonial control 
and its denouement in the consolidation of three modern colonial/imperial political 
economies. 
There is no single protagonist at the heart of this story, since the episode was a 
product of conjuncture, the historical coincidence of several disparate factors, none 
determinative. There is, however, a central focus of events, not a new technology, a new 
crop, a social process, or even a class of entrepreneurial smallholders, but a place, the 
Mazega, 521 square kilometers of exceedingly fertile black soil which lay in the lowlands 
across the joint frontier of Ethiopia, Italian Eritrea, and the Sudan's Kassala province. 
The Mazega's influence in the agricultural revolution derived from the personality 
of its exceptionally rich, but fickle vertisol. The cotton soil's interaction with moisture 
severely circumscribed the terms of its cultivation. Samuel Baker described his encounter 
with the Mazega's vertisol in 1861: 
• 
This paper results from research in Ethiopia, Sudan, Italy, and Great Britain. It also benefited from an earlier 
inquiry into the political history of the Nuqara region by Peter Garretson, "Shaykh Imam 'Abd Allah of Nuqara, 1898-
1923," unpublished paper given to me by the author. I am grateful to Working Group on Agrarian Change in Africa led 
by Sara Berry for their comments on the paper. 
The surface [ of the soil] resembled a beautiful park, composed of a 
succession of undulations, interspersed with thornless trees, and 
watered by streamlets at intervals of five to eight miles, while the 
magnificent Alps of Abyssinia bounded the view to the south; but 
there was no enjoyment of this country on horseback. The rainy season 
converted the rich loam into a pudding, and the dry season baked it 
into a pie crust. The entire surface was loose, flaky, and hollow; there 
was not a yard of ground that was not split into deep crevices, that 
were regular pitfalls; and so unsound was the general character of the 
country that a horse sank above its fetlocks at every footstep. 1 
2 
The presence of such "cotton soil" nevertheless presented, under the proper 
conditions of labor and management, a high potential for the cultivation of lowland crops 
like dura, sesame, and cotton. Indeed, the name Mazega derives from the Cushitic root 
word for sorghum. The fertility of the Mazega, however, existed only as potential; the 
expansion of agriculture depended primarily on the peculiar conjuncture of the creation 
of a new market for old types of food, the availability of time-worn forms of labor, and 
the presence of an archaic form of management. 
Finally, this paper points to the fallacy of a "Whiggish" African agricultural 
history, that is an assumption that agricultural history, in Africa or elsewhere, is 
inherently progressive. Far from being an incremental, progressive process of agrarian 
innovation, the Mazega's revolution was a finite historical episode and not a model for 
economic development since it depended on a specific set of historically determined 
factors which cannot be replicated. At the local level, the Mazega's "frontier agriculture" 
provides an example of a land-rich/labor-poor rural economy which offered a brief 
contrast to Ethiopia's historically predominant labor-rich/land-poor, plow-based highland 
system. 
Population and the Mazega 
The Mazega lay within the ethnic, political, and ecological interstices of the Sudan's 
Kassala province, the southwestern region of Italian Eritrea, and the northwestern 
Ethiopian district of Walqayt. The most salient geographic characteristics of the Mazega, 
however, were not its political borders but its river systems which linked the Eritrean and 
Ethiopian highlands to northern Sudan through the Nile system. The two most important 
of these rivers are the Setit ( or Takkaze in Ethiopia) and the Gash which eventually join 
the Atbara tributary of the Nile, and the small systems of the Bahr Salaam and Angareb 
rivers which form the Mazega's southern limits. 
Historically, the seasonal floods of these rivers and their tributaries during the 
main summer rains provided the pre-conditions for several forms of limited economic 
activity which included small-scale irrigated cultivation of cotton and cereal crops, 
transhumant pastoralism, and hunting for an exceptionally rich variety of big game. The 
seasonal nature of disease, however, further conditioned the terms of occupation by 
human, livestock, and wild animal populations. Wet seasons June through September 
brought fevers, kalazar, rinderpest, trypanosomiasis, and malaria which discouraged 
humans and domestic animals from year-round habitation but allowed seasonal in-
1 
Samuel W. Baker, The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia (London, 1894), 322. 
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migration of pastoralists, transhumant agriculturalists (who could plant in July and retreat 
upland until harvest in late January), and trypanosomiasis-resistant large game which 
required open rangelands and permanent waterholes away from human habitation. 
Though sketchy, the pre-twentieth century evidence indicates that the Mazega 
formed a depopulated, marginal economic and ecological zone between two tributary 
based polities, the Egyptian (later Mahdist) Sudan and Abyssinia, and within a regional 
economy which linked the Sudan's Nile Valley to the Red Sea trade system. Samuel 
Baker's 1861-62 hunting expedition found the Mazega teeming with big game - elephants, 
rhinoceros, buffalo - a sure sign of minimal human settlement. The two isolated pockets 
of population which had gathered around the Mazega's small hill stations at Mai Gubba 
and Nuqara were "an asylum for all the blackguards of the adjoining countries who were 
attracted by the excitement and lawlessness of the continual border warfare." 2 Regional 
political leadership came from Mek Nimr, a Sudanese bandit leader who gathered 
Ethiopian brigands, refugees from Egyptian rule, and slaves around these small 
settlements tucked along the Mazega's western edge. Further west Egypt maintained 
control of key market towns like Gedaref and Sofi, while to the east highland Abyssinia 
claimed occasional tribute from the lowlands as far west as the Atbara. After 1889 Italy's 
influence expanded west and south from the Eritrean capital at Asmara to the arid 
district between Agordat and the Seti! River, the border with Ethiopia. 
Baker's detailed account of his 1861-62 dry season visit to the Mazega depicts a 
region whose economic base was fundamentally extractive. Mek Nimr, the Hobsbawmian 
brigand and enemy of Egypt, loosely supervised freewheeling banditry, hunting, slave 
trading and the more mundane collection of area trade staples such as gum arabic, dom 
nuts, and honey. Frontier agriculture in this setting supported extraction and was limited 
primarily to provisioning Mek Nimr's settlements at Mai Gubba and Nuqara, where a few 
villages of slaves and refugees cultivated Mek Nimr's dura and cotton on the rich 
vertisol. 3 Along the Mazega's northern edge the low population density allowed pastoral 
populations (Hadendowa and Beni Amer) to plant dura, some tobacco, and cotton in the 
river valleys with the beginning of the rains and return to harvest them in mid-January to 
February, when the valleys also offered dry season pasture. 4 Christian agriculturalists 
from the foothills of Abyssinia's highland region of Walqayt, had occupied the Mazega's 
eastern edge since the fifteenth century and practiced sporadic transhumant, subsistence-
oriented cultivation. 5 Overall, Baker found the Mazega an uninhabited plain well suited to 
populating his London trophy room. 
The demographic history of the modern era began with a major political 
dislocation which kept population levels low on the Mazega but also prompted a mass 
exodus from the adjacent Ethiopian highlands. After the Mahdist capture of Kassala in 
July 1885, the region fell largely under the jurisdiction of the Suakin frontier province 
organized along military lines by Uthman Diqna. Though in constant need of grain to 
2 Baker, Nile Tributaries, 305. 
3 Ibid., 305, 314-315. 
4 
Baker's account does not refer to Beni Amer; it may be that they moved south into the Mazega only after the 
Mahdist period. David A.G. Green, Ethiopia: An Economic Analysis of Technological Change in Four Agricultural 
Production Systems (East Lansing, 1974), 9-13. See also Sarah P. Voll, "Cotton in Kassala: The Other Scheme," Journal 
of African Studies, 5, 2 (1978), 214-215. 
5 
See Giovanni Ellero, "II Uolcait," Rassegna di Studi Etiopici, 6-1 (1948), 99-100. 
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feed their frontier garrisons, the Mahdists never tapped the Mazega's potential, leaving it 
to wildlife and Hadendowa and Beni Amer pastoralists who never fully accepted rule 
from Omdurman. Shortly after Emperor Yohannes's death at Gallabat in 1889, however, 
Mahdist forces took advantage of the power vacuum and invaded the Mazega, penetrating 
as far east as Ethiopia's Walqayt highlands. According to local accounts, the Abyssinian 
population along the Mazega's eastern edge fled en masse to western Tigray to escape the 
Mahdist army, a virulent epidemic of cholera, and the local effects of the 1889-92 famine. 
The dramatic depopulation of the region was still evident in 1906 when a British 
expedition to Kafta, the Mazega's highland market, reported abandoned terraces, villages, 
and large herds of cattle wandering freely. The area remained, however, a major point of 
transshipment for the Sudanese slave trade through Tokar to the Red Sea.6 
The colonial period on the frontier began on Christmas Day 1897 when Italy ceded 
Kassala to the Anglo-Egyptian forces advancing on Omdurman. Four and a half years 
later in May 1902 Emperor Menilek agreed to a tripartite treaty which set the border 
between the three zones.7 It was to be several years, however, before policies of economic 
development penetrated from Khartoum, Addis Ababa, and Asmara and overcame the 
inertia of local economic patterns. In the first decade of the Sudan's Pax Britannica the 
adjacent lowlands remained extraction oriented, with a spirit of entrepreneurship, 
brigandage, and free trade dominating the region. Peace on the Mazega initially led not to 
agricultural development but merely afforded new opportunities for Arab, Ethiopian, and 
European hunters to claim specimens for European zoos, personal trophies, or blood-sport 
rites of passage. 8 Wider changes in the regional economy, however, set the stage for a 
major shift in economic focus from extraction to export agriculture. These changes 
initially included a dramatic shift in regional demand for food and a surge of 
immigration, opportunities which later dried up under the progressive involvement of 
colonial development policies and the slow expansion of Ethiopian suzerainty over its 
own frontier. 
Food in the Regional Economy 
The demand for food as an issue of trade, economic development, and political advantage 
provided the economic engine for the region's transformation in the two decades 
following the battles of Adwa and Omdurman and the Fashoda Incident which 
established Britain, Ethiopia, and Italy as the key geopolitical players in the region. The 
new political configuration quickly juxtaposed the frontier's pre-colonial economic base 
with long-range plans in Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Asmara to build viable extensions 
of metropolitan political economies. 
The regional distribution of food illustrates the presence of an active cross-frontier 
economy. Both Sudan and northwest Ethiopia proved to be potential net exporters of 
dura, the regional staple, while Eritrea had rapidly settled into a pattern of chronic 
6 See Dumbell report on the Kafta Caravan, Central Records Office, Khartoum (hereafter CRO), 3/1/9, May 1907. 
F.R. Wingate's report on the slave trade in Eastern Sudan claimed that the slave trade accounted for about 1000 slaves 
annually and for revenues in cash paid by merchants to Omdurman. CRO CAIRINT 3/3/46, May 1891. 
7 P.M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898 (Oxford, 1977), 239; Sudan Intelligence Report, Sudan 
Library, University of Khartoum (hereafter SIR) #88, November 1901 and #94, May 1902. 
8 SIR #89, December 1901. 
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shortage and food imports. The supply side of the dura trade from Sudan best documents 
the movement of food in the region. Between 1903 and 1909 Sudan increased its overall 
export of dura more than thirty-fold (see Table 1). Although recipients of Sudanese dura 
exports included Egypt, Aden, and the Red Sea littoral, Eritrea quickly established itself 
as a major importer. By 1915 the Italian colony was Sudan's largest customer. 
Eritrean demand for foodstuffs was a constant and growing phenomenon 
throughout the 1900-40 period. The statistical evidence on Eritrea's agricultural production 
further suggests that beyond its initial role as a food importer, the trend of need grew 
substantially through the first third of the century (see Table 2).9 
Comparable data for the northern Ethiopian frontier exports to Eritrea do not 
exist, though the weight of evidence indicates: (1) a high level of grain trade across the 
frontier directly from the Mazega, and (2) the predominance of the dura trade in the west 
- i.e. from the Mazega - over the grain trade from the weak rural economy of eastern 
Tigray. Whether the Mazega's exports ever reached the levels of the Sudan trade is open 
to conjecture, but we know that Eritrean officials preferred Ethiopian sources for dura to 
Sudanese. Moreover, given the strong overall indications of Italian trade interests in 
Ethiopia's northwest region, the Mazega's strategic position across the route to Gondar 
and the limited export potential of Ethiopia's highland agriculture, the trade across the 
Setit valley dominated Ethiopian grain exports to Eritrea. It is reasonable then to suppose 
that levels of Ethiopian exports rivaled those of Sudan during free trade periods and 
surpassed it during restrictions. 10 
Though aggregate trade figures are a rather blunt instrument for measuring local 
agricultural change, Eritrea's scanty food trade figures nevertheless suggest the weight of 
frontier imports and the Mazega's part in that trade. In 1921 Eritrea imported 1,997,400 
kilograms of dura, 55 percent of which came from Ethiopia (the bulk from the Mazega). 
By 1930, - i.e. after the collapse of Mazega production - imports from Ethiopia had 
dropped to 205,100 kilograms, when Eritrea's own inadequate dura production had dropped 
by one-quarter and Sudan had banned all dura exports to Eritrea. Given the colony's 
chronic demand, the rise in cereal imports indicates that Eritrea compensated for the the 
decline in dura from the frontier by increasing its imports from overseas. 11 
The weakness of Eritrean food production capacity was a result of frequent 
ecological crises such as the locust infestations of 1905-07, 1911-17 and 1927-31, but also 
resulted from political and economic choices made by Italian authorities. From the 
beginning of the Italian presence in 1889, expansionary factions in Rome and local 
administrators alike had been under pressure to produce direct benefits to the metropole 
such as cotton and military labor at the expense of food production. As early as 1904 
Eritrean Beni Amer crossed into Sudan complaining that their last remaining grounds for 
9 See Table 3 for Eritrea's shift away from food to cash crops. See also Branston Report in SIR #256, November 
1915. For general Eritrean policy see Irma Taddia, L'Eritrea-Colonia; Paesaggi, strutture, uomini del colonialismo 
(Milan, 1986), 279-328. 
lO For Eritrea's grain trade with Ethiopia, see James McCann, From Poverty to Famine in Northeast Ethiopia: 
A Rural History (Philadelphia, 1987), 141. For Italian preference for Ethiopian grain markets see Postewaite to 
Governor, Kassala, 11 January 1916 CRO INTEL, 2/20/170. 
11 The 205,000 kilogram figure probably represents the base import level of dura from eastern Tigray throughout 
the period when mazega export was at its height For Eritrean import figures see Annuario Statistico Italiano (Rome. 
1886-1934). 23-51, 72-77; Statistica delle movimento marittimo, 23-51, quoted in Richard Pankhurst, Economic History 
of Ethiopia (Addis Ababa, 1968). For overall import figures for grain see Tekeste, Italian Imperialism, 153. 
Table 1 
VALUE OF SUDANESE DURA EXPORTS 1903-1909 
(IN EGYPTIAN POUNDS i<E = H.06) 
Year Value Year Value 
1903 l<E5,216 1907 l<E24,412 
1904 i<E4,179 1908 i<E57,393 
1905 l<E303 1909 l<El36,599 
1906 l<E7,925 
Source: Central Economics Board, Sudan Government, The Secretary's 
Annual Report for 1909 and Customs Statistics (Khartoum, 1910). 
Table 2 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN ERITREA FROM 1921 TO 1931 
(IN 100 KILOGRAM UNITS) 
YEAR WHEAT RICE DURA TEFF MILLET OIL POTATO VEGE- COFFEE COTTON 
SEEDS TABLES 
1921 59,000 242,000 248,000 97,000 60,000 10,900 61,500 
1922 54,000 146,000 312,000 91,000 60,000 11,000 2,100 72,000 50 1500 
1923 54,060 151,000 325,000 73,000 51,000 20,000 1,500 72,000 55 3000 
1924 73,000 156,000 377,000 73,000 52,000 95,000 900 88,000 60 20,000 
1925 40,000 160,000 200,000 35,000 32,000 35,000 700 41,000 100 15,000 
1926 62,000 150,000 175,000 49,000 43,000 21,000 1,000 59,000 165 16,000 
1927 5,000 25,000 85,000 16,000 13,000 7,600 1,000 40,000 200 10,000 
1928 11,000 27,000 100,000 15,000 17,000 7,530 1,300 35,000 250 7,000 
1929 9,500 30,000 150,000 15,000 12,000 8,600 1,500 38,000 280 8,000 
1930 12,000 94,000 200,000 25,000 22,000 10,000 2,500 42,000 375 11,000 
1931 8,600 202,000 146,000 51,000 17,000 9,000 3,000 30,000 380 6,800 
Source: Tomaso Siliani, L' Africa Orientale Italiana (Eritrea e Somalia) (Rome, 1933). 
6 
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cultivating dura had been confiscated by the colonial government for cotton. In that same 
year the Eritrean authorities raised the tribute on livestock from 5 percent to 10 percent, 
thus forcing their pastoral population into Sudan and Ethiopia and away from 
transhumance patterns which traditionally had included dura cultivation within Eritrean 
borders.12 The evidence from the 1920s indicates a systematic decline in total production, a 
trend which both production and food import figures indicate began much earlier. 
Beyond the question of gross product, overall per capita production of food 
declined in Eritrea. The Eritrean population seems to have begun a period of rapid 
growth following the devastating famine and rinderpest of the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. Table 3, based on Italian censuses, indicates a fairly consistent growth 
rate of 2.9 percent, comparable to growth rates in the 1980s. 
Table 3 
POPULATION GROWTH IN ERITREA 
Year Po11ulation Year Po11ulation 
1905 274,944 1927 519,175 
1911 333,431 1931 596,013 
1917 367,239 1939 614,353 
1921 407,377 
Source: Tekeste Negash, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 149. 
Eritrea thus faced a twin problem, rapidly increasing population, and the early 
stages of flat or declining food production. With the rapid growth of urban centers, labor 
for infrastructure development and the colonial military quickly became an Italian 
colonial obsession and the lack of a rural labor force in the lowland areas of western 
Eritrea comprised a major impediment to increased agricultural production. Public works 
such as road and railroad building, housing construction, and the extension of telegraph 
lines occupied large numbers of the rural workforce, depleting the rural population 
available for agriculture. 
Eritrea's role as a recruiting ground for the colonial military also played a 
significant part of in the agricultural labor shortage .. Tekeste Negash has estimated that 
the percentage of actively productive males serving in the Italian colonial military rose 
from 73 percent in 1912 to over 40 percent by 1935.13 Between 1911 and 1931 some 80 
percent of the soldiers fighting in Italy's colonial war in Libya were troops recruited in 
Eritrea and northern Ethiopia. The total number of troops used during that period may 
have approached a quarter-million. 14 Such policies increased the overall demand for labor 
in Eritrea over the period of this study, raising wages in the region as a whole, drawing 
12 
SIR #123, October 1904. 
13 Tekeste Negash, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea: Policies, Praxis, and Impact (Uppsala, 1987), 51. 
14 Campbell Telegram to Foreign Office, FO 371/79730; for a description of the recruitment process see McCann, 
Poverty to Famine, 189-191. 
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young men and women out of the agricultural sector and increasing pressure on food 
supplies. 15 
The Eritrean demand for food from across its western border was a consistent 
feature of frontier relations with Ethiopia and Sudan as well as an important aspect of 
historical conjuncture underlying the Mazega's agricultural revolution. Ironically, Eritrea's 
economic needs complemented their long-standing policy of economic and political 
penetration of the Ethiopian empire's northern provinces. By 1901 governor Ferdinando 
Martini of Eritrea had already noted the economic necessity of incorporating northern 
Ethiopia into the Eritrean sphere and it remained a central premise of Italian policy. 16 To 
produce the long-term goal of economic penetration, Eritrean policy-makers were willing 
to provide the limitrophe Ethiopian elite with cash, cotton seed, arms, and high prices for 
stocks of dura, a prerequisite for a radical economic transformation. 17 
Labor, Management, and Frontier Agriculture 
In contrast to the traditional agrarian production equations in Ethiopia, which 
emphasized land and capital in the form of oxen, production on the Mazega depended on 
the availability of labor and, especially, the management of its recruitment. While 
Eritrea's demand for food was a product of its emerging colonial economy, the Mazega's 
response in labor recruitment derived from old formulae: slavery, long-standing 
institutions of short-term tenancy, and a distinctive "frontier agriculture" developed on the 
nineteenth century's open frontier but perfected in the early decades of colonialism. 
Labor was a necessary - though not sufficient - spur to agricultural expansion on 
the Mazega for several basic reasons. First, the area's low population density limited the 
amount of land which could be cultivated, weeded, and harvested. Throughout the 
nineteenth century disease, the absence of political security, and the absence of an 
external market for food had kept the population at low levels. The rainfall cycle also 
contributed to labor bottlenecks as well since planting had to be adjusted to substantial 
interannual variation of the start of the rains characteristic of lowland zones in Northeast 
Africa. Unlike many of Ethiopia's highland regions, rainfed agriculture on the Mazega 
allowed only one cropping season, raising the risk of a total annual crop failure. This 
environmental hazard and the presence of endemic lowland diseases effectively 
discouraged in-migration of subsistence, ox-plow agriculturalists from the highlands. 18 
15 
In the schemes that emerged choices of crops, land use, and labor allocation favored those crops most useful to 
Italian markets. Italian development schemes from coffee at Foghrena, citrus fruits at Keren, and especially cotton at 
Taklai and Tessenei in the 1920s and 1930s increased dependence on food imports. See, for example Bollettino 
dell'Istituto Coloniale Fascista, 15 July 1933, and Taddia, L'Eritrea-Colonia, 209-229. 
16 Ferdinando Martini, ll diario Eritrea di Ferdinando Martini (Florence, 1946), III, 488. A summary of Italian 
policy of penetration of northern Ethiopia is found in memorandum of 18 February 1931 in Archive Storico delle 
Ministero Africana Italiana, 54/36 #147. 
17 See SIR #250, May 1915; Dumbell Report on Kafta, April 1907, CAIRINT 3/1/9, CRO, Khartoum; and 
Postewaite memo, 11 January 1916 Intel 2/20/170. 
18 For description of climate and cropping cycle see Green, Economic Analysis, 51, and Roy L. Donahue, 
Ethiopia: Taxonomy, Cartography, and Ecology of Soils (East Lansing, 1972), 9. For demography see Baker, Nile 
Tributaries. 101, 283. 
Table 4 
MAZEGA CLIMATE AND AGRONOMY CALENDAR 
Dec. Jan. : Feb. March April May June July : Aug. 
Season - - - - - - - - - DRY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - WET 
Mean rainfall (mm.) - - - - 5.0 24 .1 64.7 189.7 217.3 
Mean temperature 26.7 25.5 26.4 29.0 · 32.1 32.4 31.0 28.1 26.7 
(•C) 
Crop operations in 
current practice: 
Sesame disc, plant weed 
Cotton pick disc, plant 
Grain sorghum --- harvest disc, plant 
Source: Green, Ethiopia: An Economic Analysis of Technological Change in Four Agricultural 
Production Systems (East Lansing, 1974), 51. 
Sept. Oct. Nov. 
- - - - - - - - - - - -
100.4 11. 7 2.5 






Second, the agronomic characteristics of the Mazega's vertisol made it ill-suited to 
labor-efficient, ox-plow agriculture. Though they are among Africa's most fertile soils, 
vertisols are difficult to plow since they tend to smear and cake with first moisture, to 
waterlog during the rains, and to dry and crack quickly at rain's end. This trait made the 
timing of cultivation critical - and hence labor-intensive - since only the period shortly 
after the rains begin is suitable for the highland scratch plow to break the soil's heavy 
crust. 19 Labor, tools, and oxen had to be available at precise times of the rains and a 
simple hand hoe appears to have been more effective in breaking the hard crust for 
seeding. Not surprisingly therefore, traditions of ox-plow agriculture in the region did not 
extend beyond the 1500 meter elevation of western Walqayt; rinderpest, liverfluke, and 
trypanosomiasis endemic to Ethiopia's western lowlands offered further disincentives for 
the few cattle which descended from the highlands, except on a short-term basis. 
Pre-colonial forms of labor recruitment, cultivation, and management - what 
might be called frontier agriculture - overcame these constraints, providing the basis for 
the Mazega's response. Technical and labor problems with the small-scale cultivation of 
dura on the Mazega had Jong been solved by local producers in the Gash and Setit valleys. 
Methods employed on the pockets of mid-nineteenth century agriculture on the Mazega 
indicate that shallow seed holes dug with a hand hoe were less time-sensitive on the 
Mazega's type of heavy vertisol than multiple passes of the highland scratch plow.20 Dura, 
like most crops in northeast Africa, was susceptible to periodic attacks by the swarms of 
desert locusts which began in the eastern Sudan and swept up the river valleys through 
northern Ethiopia to the Red Sea coast when climatic conditions permitted. Around 
Kassala part-time farmers had learned to intercrop dura with Sudanese cotton, which 
locusts tended to avoid. 21 The agriculture in place at the turn of the century, however, had 
limitations on its ability to expand to meet the new export demand: low population 
density, the need for a mercantile infrastructure, external sources of labor skilled in 
appropriate techniques, and a land tenure/management system capable of recruiting labor 
and extracting the product. 
Dura was an ideal crop for the rapid expansion of frontier agriculture in the 
Mazega's semi-arid, lowland setting. It required less labor than highland crops: a period of 
sowing in July after the onset of rains, a single, labor-intensive weeding when the seedling 
reached two centimeters, and harvest in February. Dura's drought resistance meant an 
eight-month growing season, with little competition from weeds; cultivation did not have 
to take place only in irrigated zones, and dry season labor could be put to other uses such 
as herding, trade, hunting, or gathering natural products like gum arabic, dom nuts, or 
honey, which took cultivators away from their fields. Best of all, unlike a new food crop 
19 Donahue, Taxonomy, 12-13; Paul Neate, "Animal Traction and Vertisol Cropping," ILCA Newsletter, 6,1 
(1987), 1-2. 
20 
The ineffectiveness of the highland plow system was argued by John Dalton, an agricultural. economist who 
worked on the Mazega in the 1960s. Also see Neate, "Vertisol," 1. Baker described the local tool as a "Dutch hoe." Baker, 
Nile Tributaries, 53. 
21 
See Voll, "Cotton in Kassala," 206, and Sudan Monthly Report, Sudan Library, University of Khartoum 
(hereafter SMR] #18, June-July 1930. Hadendowa and Beni Amer semi-pastoralists also solved the unreliability of the 
rains and locust threats by their mixed economy and the dist_ribution of risk across their rigid class hierarchy. Beni 
Amer, like the Tuareg of the Sahel, maintained a rigid caste system which included a subject class (nabtab) which 
provided labor for an elite class (dig/al), a system gradually eroded by wage labor and the expansion of colonial 
irrigation schemes in the 1920s and 1930s. See Taddia, L'Eritrea-Colonia, 54-55 and Tekeste, Italian Colonialism, 6-8. 
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which might meet consumer resistance, dura was the preeminent dietary staple of the 
entire region. 
The Mazega's transformation as a source of regional food derived from the use of 
seemingly anachronistic forms of labor - slavery and sharecropping. The depopulation of 
both lowland and highland zones in the aftermath of Mahdist rule and 1889-92 
pandemic/famine had left the region a political and economic tabula rasa. Demographic 
recovery and growth in the region took place rapidly, however, as colonial rule provided 
sufficient security to allow a substantial trade expansion. For the first two decades of this 
century, the social and economic conditions of abundant land resources, weak central 
government control, and a strong demand for grain established a unique historical 
conjunctural window when the social institutions of a mercantile era overlapped with the 
first stage of colonial engagement and formed the basis of rapid agricultural expansion. 
Two seemingly anachronistic sources of labor emerged, both of which were 
fundamentally linked to the quickly vanishing pre-colonial mercantile epoch and and 
strong Eritrean demand for food in a new money economy. The first was the abundant 
supply of slaves which existed in the frontier zones of Ethiopia and Sudan. The region 
had long been a key transit point in the slave trade routes between eastern Sudan and the 
Red Sea but rarely had absorbed large numbers within its own economy. While visitors in 
to the northwest frontier in the mid-nineteenth century had observed scattered lowland 
villages inhabited by slaves, by 1910 observers remarked on the large and growing 
numbers of such settlements which remitted their annual January/February harvests of 
dura, sesame, or cotton to their masters at Nuqara or the highlands to the east.22 
The number of these slave villages reflected new efforts of labor recruitment in 
response to the new market for agricultural commodities. Alfonso Tancredi, travelling 
through the Mazega in 1907, noted the country was inhabited by "Galla" slaves under the 
direction of a chief, also a slave, "who cultivate on behalf of their patrons dwelling in the 
cooler climate of the highlands." 23 While slaves were common in the rural economy of 
northern Ethiopia and eastern Sudan, they were never a dominant form of labor. The 
Mazega, therefore, represents one of the few examples of slavery as a primary form of 
agricultural labor in the region. 24 
The second source of labor for agricultural expansion on the Mazega was the 
population of Fallata or "Tokrooris," pilgrims from Western Sudan (Dar Fur) and West 
Africa on their way to Mecca who had settled along Sudan's eastern marches as 
cultivators, petty traders, and day labor. Though many individuals were only temporary 
residents and continued the hajj, collectively the population constituted a major source of 
labor and entrepreneurship in the frontier region. In the 1860s they inhabited a forty-mile 
stretch of the Gallabat area south of the Mazega and numbered about twenty thousand. 
22 
See for example, Dumbell Report on the Kafta Caravan, May 1907, CRO CAIRINT 3/1/9 and Ellero, "Il 
Uolcait," 110. For nineteenth century see Baker, Nile Tributaries, 187-88, purchased a "Galla" slave at Gedaref as a 
maidservant. 
23 
Alfonso Tancredi, "La missione delle Societi Geografica Italiana in Etiopia settentrionale," Bollettino delta 
Societi Geografica ltaliana, 45 (1908), 1209. See also Dumbell report; slave villages were described in passing in many 
Sudan official communications. 
24 
For analysis of southern slavery systems and those of the north see Tekalign Walde Mariam, "Slavery and the 
Slave Trade in the Kingdom of Jimma (ca. 1800-1935)" (M.A thesis, Addis Ababa University, 1984); and James McCann, 
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332-356. 
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Baker noted that "the Tokroori is a most industrious laborer and were he assured of 
protection and moderate taxation, he would quickly change the character of these fertile 
lands [i.e. the Mazega] that are now uninhabited except by wild animals." 25 
By the turn of the century large numbers of Fallata had reached as far north as 
Kassala and occupied portions of the Mazega as sharecroppers. By 1907 Tancredi 
described them as making up a substantial portion of the agricultural labor force in the 
region who settled in villages and farmed "on the half" to generate sufficient funds to 
continue the hajj or to invest in mercantile accumulation. In 1915 Sudan government 
reports indicated that Fallata made up a large portion of El Imam's villagers. 26 
On the Mazega's eastern edges, Christian cultivators returning to the Kafta region 
also adjusted land tenure/tribute relations to suit the needs for labor recruitment. 
Cultivators who had held land as risti (land claimed on the basis of ambilineal descent) 
prior to the Mahdist invasions transformed the land system on their reoccupation to one 
founded on claims made on the basis of residence (chiraf gwoses). This shift in land-
holding practice had two implications: first, it abrogated tribute obligations to local elite 
accrued on risti land, a form which required tribute payments regardless of whether land 
was under cultivation; and second, the residence-based system also encouraged claims by 
new migrants in a labor-short rural economy, but required payments of the tribute only 
on land in use. This arrangement, a common response in highland land tenure to 
population decline, attracted new immigrants who placed their household slaves in 
Mazega agricultural villages. 27 Village production provided cash income and contrasted 
with less economically productive non-agricultural highland household slavery. 
These forms of labor proved ideal for a quick and effective response to Eritrean 
demands for food and drew on the experience of the bandit hill stations, which fed 
themselves on local produce throughout the nineteenth century. The use of slaves and 
Fallata with no local land claims allowed masters and landlords to manage farms from 
the highlands and healthy hill station retreats. As temporary sharecroppers Fallata made 
excellent tenants who made no claims on the land and adapted quickly to the local cash 
economy. That both categories of cultivators had no potential claims on land meant a 
maximum extractive potential impossible with highland peasants or settled pastoralists. 
The Mazega's agricultural economy developed quickly in response to Eritrean 
demand because of available labor, but equally because of effective management of the 
transitional political environment. Historical sources offer only brief glimpses of 
managers. Their numbers and background were diverse, but they seem to share common 
traits which linked an experience in extraction to a keen appreciation of market 
opportunities, and a knowledge of pre-colonial forms of labor. The managers and 
recruiters of the Mazega's labor pool ranged from slave-holding highlanders to ex-hunters 
and cashiered Mahdist soldiers like El Imam Abdillahi of Nuqara who sought to 
transform the Mazega's potential into part of their own political strategies. 
25 Baker, Nile Tributaries, 346-347. 
26 
See Tancredi, "La missione," 1208 and CRO INTEL 2/20/170, Home to Governor, Kassala, 4 November 1915. 
27 
This transformation is described in Ellero, "Ii Uolcait," 108-109. Dan Bauer has discussed similar changes in land 
claims as a result of demographic pressure, though from the opposite direction, i.e. from residence-based to risti as a 
result of population growth. See Dan F. Bauer, "Land, Leadership, and Legitimacy in Enderta, Tigre" (Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Rochester, 1972), 218. Dumbell reported the use of highland household slaves on the Mazega in 1907. See 
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El Imam ( or Ali Jeman) Abdillahi, an ex-soldier of the Khalifa and Italian 
prisoner of war, was a model for and probably the principal actor among managers who 
built the political framework for the Mazega's agricultural revolution. Released by his 
Italian captors in 1901, El Imam quickly earned a reputation as a hunter, leading highland 
Ethiopians on trophy safaris and demonstrating precise knowledge about the lowland 
Mazega disdained by highlanders. El Imam quickly gained a following around his 
settlement at Nuqara which prompted the Ethiopian government to bestow on him the 
title balambaras and give him 1000 talers a year to defend their interests on the border. In 
1906, however, he was imprisoned in Sudan after leading a raid - probably for slaves - on 
Sudanese territory, and sentenced to death by Dajazmach Gassasa, the Ethiopian regional 
governor of Walqayt. 28 On the intercession of the Italian government, El Imam returned 
to Nuqara within the year where he shortly began to engage in traditionally ambiguous 
frontier politics and to manage an agricultural boom, accepting Italian payments in cash 
and agricultural capital (mostly seeds) while avowing loyalty to his Ethiopian patrons. 
El Imam and his motley group of refugees, brigands, and entrepreneurs settled 
around his village of Nuqara began to build an agricultural export economy out of the 
depopulated Mazega. By 1910 his efforts resulted in a series of villages spread across the 
Mazega, producing dura stored and marketed at Nuqara for shipment by camel into 
Eritrea. These villages offered land and temporary succor to Fallata hajji and sites for 
effective use of slave labor still abundant on Ethiopia's side of the border. El Imam and 
the entrepreneurial class supplied the tools of local technology - seed, hoes, spades, and 
occasionally oxen and plows in exchange for half the harvest after taxes.29 Not 
surprisingly, El Imam became a major participant in the frontier's political economy of 
food shortly thereafter. 
The regional political context of this economic expansion was also important since 
the free trade of food, toleration for slavery, and non-interference in cross-frontier trade 
from central authorities allowed appropriate allocation of labor and resources to export 
production. The fluidity of Ethiopian politics before the 1920s offered ample opportunities 
for local frontier entrepreneurship. The politics of Menilek's court in Addis Ababa, 
especially after his debilitating stroke in 1906, promoted local squabbling between 
factional rivals Dajazmach Gassasa (the Empress Taytu's nephew) and Dajazmach 
Makonnan, leaving the lowland frontier to shifta (bandits) leaders who hunted, raided for 
slaves, and occasionally served as representatives of the imperial government. 30 As local 
Balambaras, El Imam enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom from his highland 
superiors, even though the formal border afforded protection from the restrictive edicts 
of his colonial neighbors, especially regarding slavery. 
The Ethiopian imperial government's policy toward its northwest frontier 
reflected its own adjustments in a new political economy centered on Addis Ababa, 600 
kilometers to the south. By 1910 the Shawan faction in Addis Ababa had ousted the 
empress and placed its own appointees in office in the provinces. In 1912 Ras (later Negus) 
Walda Giyorgis took responsibility for the northwest and established El Imam as his local 
28 Tancredi, "La missione," 1208-1209. 
29 Though the evidence is not conclusive, it appears that slaves may have cultivated under the same terms as the 
Fallata. Tancredi, "La missione," 1209 describes slave villages as unguarded. 
JO The best source for these local politics is the Sudan Intelligence Reports for the years 1906-17. Events in 
Addis are described in Chris Prouty, Empress Taytu and Menilek II (London, 1986), 305-348. 
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representative for Nuqara and the Mazega. Walda Giyorgis was an old hand at exploiting 
a frontier economy from his experience as governor of the southwest district of Kaffa 
and reportedly brought several hundred slaves to the north with him. He therefore 
provided a free hand locally for the use of slavery, encouraged an open frontier, and 
tolerated channels of communication and trade with Eritrea. From Wolde Giyorgis's 
somewhat venal perspective the economic success of the region provided convenient 
informal contact with the Italians, generated substantial tribute in cash, and stockpiled 
foodstuffs for military campaigns in the region. Under Walda Giyorgis, El Imam appears 
to have ceased receiving payments for his services and began remitting tribute in cash to 
his superior, a sign of the Mazega's new economic fortunes. 
Most important, the rough-and-ready frontier administrative system on the 
Ethiopian side allowed the systematic exploitation of slave labor, a luxury increasingly 
denied on the Sudan and Eritrean sides of the frontier. With dura prices rising steadily in 
the 1906-1910 period, increasing amounts of labor meant increased profits. This expansion 
on the Ethiopian side was not only tolerated by Walda Giyorgis, but even encouraged. 31 
The years 1906-1915 were therefore a watershed for the transition of the Mazega 
and northwest frontier in general from a depopulated pastoral zone to a vibrant 
agricultural, export-oriented economy responding to regional demand for food. Villages of 
slaves and Fallata managed by entrepreneurial frontiersmen produced substantial 
surpluses of dura - as well as some sesame and cotton - for shipment to an increasingly 
dura-hungry Eritrea. The fluidity of the regional political economy resulted from a 
combination of local initiative, the rapid deployment of new labor in old forms, and the 
embryonic state of national policies in Addis Ababa, Asmara, and Khartoum, and, of 
course, the Mazega's highly elastic potential. 
The Political Economy of Dura on the Frontier, 1915-20 
In the years leading up to World War I a remarkable set of complementary interests in 
the production and distribution of food existed on the Sudan-Eritrea-Ethiopia frontier. 
Colonial policy was still in an embryonic state and not yet threatened by free trade on 
the frontier. Through most of the 1910-1920 period three central governments were content 
to allow the free flow of food and population within the frontier region, which quickly 
developed into an active and monetized free trade zone. Maria Teresa talers, always in 
short supply in Ethiopia's rural areas, were provided by Khartoum and Asmara as a 
means of stimulating trade; talers functioned as a regional currency and spurred the 
commoditization of· agricultural goods previously confined to the domestic domain. This 
specie also provided an important cash income for the Ethiopian political elite, the local 
mercantile class, and frontier opportunists like El Imam. The dominant premise of this 
emerging and vibrant regional economy, however, was an open frontier, the availability of 
agricultural labor, and substantial investment from Eritrea in subsidizing trade with 
Ethiopia. 
31 Peter Garretson has argued from Sudanese sources that Walda Giyorgis encouraged the the expansion of dura• 
producing slave villages to areas even outside the Mazega. Garretson, "Shaykh Imam," cites CRO INTEL El Imam 
Abdallahi to H.E. Ras Waldo Giyorgis, 7 December 1911, 2/2U173. 
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Early in the colonial period, Italian officials recognized Eritrea's economic 
dependence on Ethiopia as a market and source of food.32 Inexpensive food supplies from 
across the frontier allowed them to moderate the price of labor and turn the economic 
reorganization of the colony toward production directly responsive to the needs of Italy 
and the strategic penetration of northern Ethiopia. Importing food from across the 
frontier furthered Eritrea's two primary policy goals: first, it strengthened economic 
relations with Ethiopia's local elite; and second, it allowed the diversion of Eritrea's own 
rural labor force to military and mercantile activity, the latter reflecting the re-export of 
Sudanese and Ethiopian products as the colony's major income earner. 33 
For Sudanese producers and merchants on the frontier, the ready market provided 
by Eritrea's chronic food shortfalls supported a cash income for surplus producers, fueled 
an expanding merchant community in the frontier towns of Kassala and Gedaref, and 
raised labor rates for agricultural labor throughout the regional economy. The Anglo-
Egyptian government's administrative interests prior to 1920 were more passive: frontier 
relations were satisfactory if bandit activity was kept at a minimum, and if local frontier 
development did not interfere with Nile floods or too adversely affect labor rates in the 
regional economies of Gedaref or Kassala. 
For Ethiopia's imperial government, the primary theater of political action was 
their growing capital at Addis Ababa, while the engine of economic growth of the new 
political economy was the extractive activity and, increasingly, coffee production located 
to the south and east of the capital. Moreover, Addis Ababa - a month's journey from the 
northwest frontier in any case - was embroiled in a succ~ssion crisis between 1906 and 
1916 in which the dura trade on the northwest periphery played no role. This inattention 
to events on the northwest frontier therefore offered substantial freedom for elite in the 
northwest who found the economic permeability of the frontier zone and the Mazega in 
particular to be profitable. Relations of production on the Mazega allowed the elite to to 
control labor and land, since the Mazega fell outside the highland land system and 
therefore permitted the extraction of a commodity in high demand, in this case food. Such 
opportunities to generate cash contrasted dramatically with economic relations on the 
subsistence-oriented highlands where land-holding and tribute relations generated only a 
limited income in kind and where markets in agricultural products were generally weak.34 
If the years 1915-1920 witnessed rapid growth in food trade, the decade also marked 
a transitional period in economic relations between frontier zones and their central 
governments. Free trade benefited local elites and labor but not central development 
planners who sought political stability and centralized economic development. Through 
the decade's second quinquennium, the effects of world war, ecological crises, and the 
domination of centerist economic policies in Asmara, Addis Ababa, and Khartoum eroded 
the regional economic integration which had underwritten local prosperity. 
Eritrea's economic stagnation foreshadowed a regional economic crisis. By 1915 
three years of drought in Eritrea had devastated the colony's rural economy and 
entrenched the pattern of Eritrean food deficits. Even though the frontier's first irrigated 
cotton was grown on the Eritrean portion of the Gash River, by 1914 Italy's "Societ per Ia 
32 
Martini, Diario, III, 488; also see note. 
33 
Taddia, L'Eritrea-Colonia, 329-339. 
34 
For an effective description of highland tribute system see Donald Crummey, "Abyssinian Feudalism," Past 
and Present, 89, (1980), 115-138. 
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coltivazione de! cotone" had gone into liquidation and exportable good from the colony's 
western frontier were limited almost exclusively to the collection and processing of dom 
nuts and their export as buttons to Italy. 35 A Sudan official travelling in Eritrea in 1915 
reported on the poor state of Eritrea's food production in the region between Kassala and 
Asmara: 
Most foodstuffs are very dear here .... Nowhere in the country did I 
see any really good crops of dura. Here and there were small patches 
by the side of khors [explain], but the crops always seemed to have 
insufficient water .... I should say that, with few exceptions, all their 
dura was imported from Kassala or Gedaref. Every day I met caravans 
of 20-50 camels with dura from Sudan.36 
Eritrea's food deficits during the war years contrasted with favorable conditions in 
Sudan, which in 1915 enjoyed its best trade year (primarily foodstuffs from a bumper 
harvest) since the beginning of the condominium. Beginning in July, Eritrean traders tried 
to make up for food deficits in the colony by expanding reliance on frontier markets. By 
the end of the year Eritrea had imported over 19,000 tons of dura from Sudan alone, as 
against 356 tons the year before. Exports from the Mazega were not recorded, but must 
have been substantial as well. Conditions on the Ethiopian side appear to have been so 
favorable that El Imam expanded his own scheme's holding and established a "large 
number" of his own Fallata villages across the Sudan frontier near Jebel Lukdi, an 
extension of the Mazega. 37 
While the level of Eritrean demand and Sudan's export is clear, the Ethiopian 
trade figures - i.e. those of the Mazega - are not documented. Other evidence, however, 
suggests it may have approached the Sudanese figures. We know that Walda Giyorgis's 
1910-1918 tenure was generally one of agricultural expansion encouraged by the Ras and 
that an active trade between Eritrea and Ethiopian districts across the Setit was well 
enough underway in 1915 for the Italians to begin work on an iron railroad bridge across 
the Setit.38 Sudan sources indicate clearly that Eritrean authorities preferred to import 
from Ethiopia. In January 1916 the Sudanese district commissioner at Gedaref, anxious to 
stimulate local trade and overcome Ethiopian advantages, complained that Eritrean 
merchants were not being allowed to bring their camels to Gedaref. He attributed the 
problem to the Italians' desire to expand economic relations with northwest Ethiopia: 
Not a single camel has been allowed to come to Gedaref this season 
from Eritrea. The reason given by the Italians that they find it more 
convenient to purchase grain in Abyssinia is a strange one considering 
they could get as much as they required in the Atbara for 20 PT per 
ardeb whereas they are actually paying from 70 to 90 PT at Nogara. 39 
35 
Branston Report on visit to Eritrea in SIR #256 November 1915j Taddia, L'Eritrea-Colonia, 313. 
36 Branston Report, SIR #256. 
37 
Home to Governor, Kassala, CRO INTEL 2/20/170, 4 November 1915. 
38 
See CRO Intel 1/4/16 and 1/4/17 for Italian relations on the frontier. 
39 
Postewaite to Governor Kassala, 11 January 1916, CRO INTEL 2/20/170. PT = piastres; 1 English Pound = 97.5 
piastres. An ardeb is a local unit of volume equal to 198 liters. 
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This complaint suggests two additional features of the political economy of food 
distribution. First, reports of wild price fluctuations at Nuqara and elite control over 
production suggests the ability to manipulate supply. Second, the high price of dura in 
northwest Ethiopia borne by the Eritrean government was likely the economic cost of 
political penetration of the strategically important northwest and perhaps even 
constituted an informal subsidy to EI Imam and Ras Walda Giyorgis. This relationship 
appears to have been part of the overall tacit agreement which Ras Walda Giyorgis, 
governor of the northwest since 1914, had developed with Eritrean officials through EI 
Imam. 40 
The regional food market, and especially the dominant position of northwest 
Ethiopia, eventually raised concerns at national levels. In early 1916 the first evidence of 
centralized manipulation of frontier food markets took place. Khartoum acted to balance 
trade on the frontier and to break up what they perceived as a growing Italian monopoly 
in northwest Ethiopia and pressure on labor rates in Kassala. Sudan officials, for their 
part, also wanted to manage the export of dura and its effect on the regional economy of 
food prices, labor rates, the cost of living in urban areas, and the political effects of a 
profitable trade relation between Eritrea and northwest Ethiopia. In February Governor-
General Wingate therefore wrote to Governor Cerrina in Asmara informing him that 
"owing to excessive demand for dura at Kassala," Eritrea should direct its caravans to 
Gedaref, thus cutting off Eritrea's access to the cheap dura at Kassala. Eritrea's desperate 
need for food imports was immediately evident. Despite Italian protests about the 
unfeasibility of dura purchase at Gedaref, in March 1916 they imported over 1400 camel 
loads of the cereal (c. 350 tons) from Gedaref in a ten-day period. 41 
In a wartime mood the political economy of dura exports became a strategic as 
well as a local phenomenon. In London the Foreign Office recognized the strategic value 
of dura exports as a means of supporting an ally during war conditions and authorized 
the export of up to 4,000 tons per month provided that none of it should reach the 
Ottoman-controlled regions on the Red Sea's eastern littoral. By the end of the year 
Eritrea had imported 19,136 tons of Sudanese dura, 34 percent of the country's total export. 
Four-fifths of that total came directly across Eritrea's western border. 42 Though no 
comparable statistical data exist for the Mazega, imports across the Setit must have been 
substantial also. 
By 1917 the food trade between the three zones had reached a sophisticated level 
with local forces and state authority each maneuvering to establish advantage. A good 
example of this sophistication is the evidence of price manipulation attempted by EI 
Imam in the early part of that year. In December 1916 - just before the harvest -
Sudanese border intelligence noted inordinately high prices for dura and a shortage of 
foodstuffs at Nuqara, the main market for Mazega harvests. In early January the price 
fell sharply and then rose again in February - the primary harvest month for sorghum -
to 60-70 piastres per ardeb, a high price for what was apparently a good harvest. 
The available evidence suggests strongly that the fluctuation of prices and 
assumptions about food shortages has resulted partially from the seasonality of supply but 
4o See SIR #256 January 1916. 
41 
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more directly from a conscious effort at price-fixing by El Imam at Nuqara. First, the 
high prices and reported shortages of December fell heavily in early January - the pre-
harvest period of highest demand and shortest supply - as a direct result of an Italian 
decision to close the border and cut off trade. Although they attributed the fall to the 
border closing, British observers could not account for the previously high price. I believe 
that the previous inflated price was the result of local elites, especially El Imam, 
withholding stockpiled dura from the market and driving prices up. Local rumors alleged 
the same, since in January reports had reached Gedaref that El Imam had "swindled the 
Italians over some deal on dura.' 43 The closing of the border was a short-lived Italian 
response; in February - the height of the harvest and greatest supply - the price of dura 
rose again in response to pent-up demand and trade resumed. 44 
The level of the dura trade, its strategic value, and its role in determining labor 
costs inevitably attracted the intervention of state authorities of the three limitrophe 
powers. In the first stage of response, Eritrean colonial authorities shifted policies to 
protect their own long-term development plans the colony's overall fiscal health at the 
expense of cross-border trade. In mid-1917 the Eritrean government decided not to accept 
Maria Teresa talers as legal tender in Eritrea, prohibiting use of the regional economy's 
primary currency. This policy had a devastating effect on Eritrea's western border trade. 
Eritrean merchants buying grain from the Mazega or Gedaref had only lire and whatever 
talers they were able to accumulate on the black market. With this policy Italian officials 
had set a higher priority on the colonial economy's link to the metropole than the health 
of the frontier trade, underwritten by a common currency. 45 
From the Sudan side an increasingly activist colonial state policy influenced the 
movement of dura as frontiers became less permeable. In March 1917, after a brisk export 
for January and February, the Sudanese authorities prohibited the export of dura to 
Eritrea; exports from March through June 1917 were nil and negligible for July and 
August. Together with the Kassala restriction of the year before, this was the first time 
that state policy had consciously interfered with the movement of food between the three 
zones. Sudan government motivations are not totally clear, but from Central Economics 
Board reports it appears that war conditions had increased dura demands from Egypt 
where food prices had long been a barometer of fedaheen quiescence. Sudan authorities 
also feared Ottoman agitation in Sudan itself and were well aware that high food prices 
in urban areas like Kassala and Khartoum could transmography into pan-Islamic 
nationalism. While beneficial to rural producers near the frontier and to a growing class 
of urban merchants, the dura trade raised urban food prices and labor costs at a time 
when labor and security issues had top priority. Though the Sudan-side sources are silent 
on the issue, the local demands on Ethiopian supplies must have increased demand for El 
Imam's stocks. 
By the end of 1917 the regional food trade succumbed to the environment. In 
August of that year a major locust infestation swept through the Setit valley and 
43 
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devastated food crops in Eritrea and northern Ethiopia, likely including the Mazega. By 
September conditions forced Eritrea to make a special request for food aid from 
Khartoum, which was granted. 46 Moreover, by September it was clear that the rains in 
much of northern highland Ethiopia had failed. The immediate effects of this crisis were 
reduced supplies of food in Eritrea and northwest Ethiopia and the migration of 
numerous small parties of Ethiopian and Eritreans into Sudan. While many of these were 
transhumant pastoralists, many others may have been the Fallata and slaves which made 
up the bulk of labor on the Mazega, i.e. the foundation of the region's productivity. 
Regional food supplies became a strategic issue again in 1918 when locust swarms 
returned and the Sudan Central Economics Board decided that the war-time needs of 
Egypt and the empire outweighed the advantages of export and banned all but emergency 
shipments to Eritrea. In November 1919 Eritrea made a special request to Egypt to 
provide 1200 tons of dura to "relieve distress."47 Although this limited request was granted, 
the ban on trade continued for eleven more years and was a major source of tension 
between the two governments and major economic wedge between the two frontiers. 48 
For Eritrea where dura supplies, according to Sudan intelligence sources, were 
"almost unobtainable," the effect of the trade ban in the 1917-1919 period was serious 
indeed. Desert locusts followed their three-year cycle, deepening the decline in food 
production. Eritrean trade figures, though sketchy, indicate a consistent increase in 
overseas food imports, particularly in non-dura grains. Moreover, northern Ethiopia seems 
to have been affected by similar production shortfalls, the great influenza pandemic, and 
the after-effects of the struggle for political control at the center. (See below.)49 
On the Ethiopian side of the border the environmental disasters of the 1917-1919 
period only exacerbated the northwestern frontier's longer term losses in the political 
arena. The bargaining position of El Imam and local elites had eroded considerably. In 
1917 the Sudan Inspector at Gedaref reported that El Imam's annual revenues from the 
dura trade had dropped from the usual 4000-6000 to 1500 talers. This drop was certainly 
not due to a decline in Eritrean demand but more likely the result of a poor harvest on 
the Mazega that year and withdrawal of the Italian subsidies of cash and cotton seed, 
which had helped underwrite labor recruitment and profitability. More profound still, 
rumors spread that much of the Mazega's labor had taken flight across the frontier to 
better labor conditions. 50 
Major political changes had also taken place in the region as an indirect result of 
events in Addis Ababa where the 1916 victory of Ras Tafari's Shawan faction over Lij 
Iyasu's followers meant a new assertion of central authority throughout the empire. 
Moreover, in 1918 Ras Walda Giyorgis died, eroding El Imam's political support The 
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following year the new government in Addis Ababa asserted its new prerogatives and 
gave the northwest regions of Walqayt, Simen, and Nuqara to Dajazmach Ayalaw Berru, a 
devotee of the young Ras Tafari, and a nationalist hostile to Italian economic ventures in 
the region. Ras Tafari thereafter began the systematic appointment of a class of "New 
Ethiopians" to control customs, reign in the slave trade, and control the frontier. 51 As a 
low value per unit commodity, dura was a poor candidate for clandestine trade. Therefore, 
even with the return of favorable weather conditions in the 1920 harvest year, the 
political climate for the resumption of their regional food economy had dissipated. Even 
if state policy in Eritrea increasingly relied on imported grain, Sudanese and Ethiopian 
policy favored stricter frontier controls. 
As for the Mazega and its chief economic architect EI Imam Abdillahi, the 
promise of prosperity barely reached the decade of the 1920s. EI Imam's personal fortunes 
ran afoul of fundamental changes in Ethiopian politics of the center. The death of Ras 
Walda Giyorgis in 1918 resulted in a radically changed political climate on the Ethiopian 
side of the frontier and in 1918 EI Imam was briefly imprisoned by the new governor 
Ayalaw Birru. Though released the following year, by 1922 the central government placed 
government troops in his villages and fined him heavily. 52 
By 1924 EI Imam was dead, as was the conjuncture of conditions which had 
prompted the rapid rise of the food export economy of northwest Ethiopia and the 
Mazega's revolution. The decline and collapse of the Mazega's exports indicates less the 
failure of EI Imam's strategies than the inevitable strengthening of central authority and 
the breakdown of free trade in the frontier economy - i.e. the dissolution of the 
conjunctural window. Local prerogatives in the recruitment of labor and the movement of 
trade, especially food, had diminished with the growth of colonial policy toward the 
region. In the first instance, Sudanese and Eritrean control over their periphery curtailed 
and later eliminated traditional sources of slaves and offered safe haven to slaves and 
tenants from Ethiopia who fled across the border. Ethiopia's consolidation of its own 
southern periphery in the first two decades of the century also restricted new supplies of 
slave labor. 53 Second, Eritrean and Sudanese decisions to push their own development 
schemes through the 1920s and 1930s raised labor rates within their borders, further 
drawing down the labor pool critical to productivity on the Mazega. 54 
Dura and Development in a Decade of Expansion 1920-30 
By the early 1920s the resurgence of world commodity prices induced colonial 
governments in Sudan and Eritrea to dust off pre-war plans to exploit the waters of the 
Nile valley for cotton exports. The irrigation schemes were both regional and national in 
scope requiring the integration of policies for labor, food, and commodity production. 
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Sudan's plans called for a major cotton/dura growing scheme on the Gezira using Blue 
Nile waters for series of dams, including one on Ethiopia's Lake Tana, supplemented by a 
second scheme at Kassala using water from the Gash to irrigate traditional Hadendowa 
land in the Gash Delta. 55 Long-standing Eritrean plans to dam the Gash for a state-
financed cotton scheme finally got underway in 1923. In December 1924 British and 
Italian officials agreed on a water-sharing plan which fixed the amount of water Eritrea 
could claim from the Gash and provided for an Italian share in profits from cultivation 
on the Sudan side.56 Though the Lake Tana dam never materialized, the Gezira scheme 
began its first irrigated production in 1925 and the Italian Tessenei project watered its 
first fields in 1927. 
The conjuncture of metropolitan pressure to produce cotton, the need to provide 
cheap, reliable labor for development schemes on the Nile, on the Gash in Eritrea, and at 
Kassala, and the effect of food prices on labor rates resulted in important policy shifts 
affecting the frontier region in the 1920s. The Italians' need to develop their own labor 
supply and their disillusionment with their Ethiopian ally El Imam resulted in the end of 
seed and cash subsidies to production on the Mazega. Italian policy sought to import labor 
and to produce food through its own share cropping schemes rather than support such 
production across the border. 57 
The opening of the Gezira scheme in 1926 further linked the issues of food, labor, 
and economic development. By 1926 the Sudan's Central Economics Board indicated the 
effect of colony wide development on the region: 
Since September 1925 grain for food has been scarce and dear and the 
resultant increase in the cost of living has had an unfavorable reaction 
in many directions. . . . Cotton growing will impinge on grain 
production whenever the need for providing additional supplies of 
grain to meet the extra demand for food grains in the Gezira becomes 
urgent. As cotton cultivation extends and the wealth of the Gezira 
population increases, the rise in the standard of living combined with 
the large seasonal influx of labor from outside the scheme for hoeing 
and picking may mean in the course of time that the Gezira will 
become an importer of dura. 58 
This logic was borne out by poor crop years in 1926 and 1927, when Sudanese food 
prices rose along with labor rates. While the search for a labor/food price formula 
continued into the 1930s, the effects of depression and war overwhelmed the dynamics of 
the regional cross-border agrarian economy with each government claiming its own 
resources for national development. 
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The Mazega's agricultural boom barely reached the decade of the 1920s and the 
dissolution of the historical conjuncture which brought on its short-lived revolution. If 
Eritrea's demand for food increased, the other prerequisites for exploiting the Mazega's 
potential declined rapidly. Through the 1920s the area's population base declined as slave 
supply dried up and slave farmers found a safe haven across colonial borders in Sudan 
and Eritrea while Fallata fled to higher wages.59 At the same time Eritrea's own attempts 
at development in the Gash valley - and military mobilization in 1935 - drew labor from 
across the border, providing incentives for both slaves and Fallata to leave the Mazega 
for wage labor or better conditions of sharecropping. Capital had dried up with the 
Italians' decision to invest on the Eritrean side of the frontier and the overall lack of 
interest in rural development by the Ethiopian Imperial government. Regional trade 
across their joint frontier ground to a halt. By 1929 the traveller Hermann Norden met 
only three caravans in three weeks crossing the Mazega between the Eritrean frontier 
and Gondar. 60 
Epilogue: The Mazega's Potential Reborn 
Ironically, the Mazega experienced a rapid revival of its potential in the early 1960s as the 
Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture's Setit-Humera Project. In this case the Mazega's 
contribution was sesame, a commercial crop as ideally suited as dura to local conditions of 
labor, climate, and soil. The formula for success was remarkably similar to that half a 
century earlier though the results were perhaps even more dramatic. In the late 1950s 
Ethiopia annually produced c. 10,000 metric tons of sesame, making it the world's fourth 
largest producer. By 1972, however, annual production had increased by 520 percent. 
Ethiopia's production constituted a full 25 percent of the world's supply, with 75 percent 
of that total produced on the Mazega's 521 square kilometers, astonishing growth 
accomplished within a decade with local capital and labor. 
The reappearance of the Mazega in commercial agriculture not only affirmed its 
potential but gives some idea of the scale of its capacity under a special set of conditions. 
Again, the critical ingredients were labor and a timely infusion of capital. In the 1960s the 
labor was not provided by slavery or Fallata tenancy; highland peasants made up 85 
percent of a total workforce of from 65,000 to 100,000 workers migrating seasonally off 
the adjacent highlands and seeking cash income as wage laborers and sharecroppers. 61 
Beyond traditional labor, the Mazega hosted the most successful mechanization program 
in Ethiopian development history where tractors replaced not ox-plows but hand hoes.62 
As in El Imam's day capital came from Eritrea, though not from Italian subsidies but 
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from Eritrean merchants, urban bureaucrats, and military pensioners who invested in 
mechanization, marketing infrastructure, and labor contracts. 
The overall success of agriculture on the Mazega rested, then as before, on a 
confluence of factors: the productive capacity of the area's vertisol, the recruitment of 
labor, and an accessible market. The promise of the early 1970s collapsed, then as before, 
when sources of labor and capital evaporated. Land reform in 1975, which prohibited 
holdings above 10 hectares and forbade private agricultural labor, abruptly ended the 
revival. Production fell from 84,600 tons in 1974 to 3,400 in 1979, a decline which paralleled 
the earlier collapse of dura production. Attempts by the socialist government to 
reorganize the scheme as a state farm using the forced labor of urban "lumpens" failed 
quickly and completely. 63 
Conclusion: Conjuncture and Sources for 
African Agricultural History 
By reliance on colonial documents and oral evidence drawn from post-colonial 
institutions African agricultural history may be predisposed to celebrate events with 
contemporary manifestations. The Mazega's agricultural boom was a short-lived eddy in 
the strong current of colonial expansion which appeared and dispersed before colonial 
documents fully recorded it. Moreover, the conjuncture which produced the historical 
moment and then dissolved took with it the local political and social institutions which 
would have preserved oral evidence. It is not surprising then that African history's 
reliance upon oral sources has tended to promote a "Whiggish," progressive historiography 
eluded by conjunctural episodes which erode rapidly and leave only scattered 
doc um en tary traces. 
Conjunctural episodes thus offer difficult models for social science and policy 
makers since they do not constitute models for development and depend on historical 
accident. If anything, the Mazega's agricultural revolution is an anti-model since its 
success derived from an serendipitous confluence of factors - soil, labor, a market, and 
archaic forms of management and labor - rather than a progression of events which will 
inform contemporary policy decisions. The conjuncture of events which created a 
dramatic expansion of food supply on the Mazega - in one of Africa's most famine-prone 
regions - was a finite episode which illuminates the region's history but not necessarily 
its economic future. 
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Table 5 
SUDANESE DURA EXPORTS TO ERITREA 1914-1940 
Year Ex11orts in Tons Comments 
1914 359 
1915 19,956 Poor crop year in Eritrea 
1916 19,136 Eritrea takes 34% of total export 
1917 13,116 Exports to Eritrea restricted 
1918 6,052 War restrictions and need to 
guarantee supplies to Egypt 
1919 1,285 Restrictions; bad crop in Sudan 
1920 2,219 Restrictions continue 
1921 430 Restrictions continue 
1922 64 Restrictions continue 
1923 1,084 Restrictions continue 
1924 nil Sudan grain export restricted 
1925 nil Sudan grain export restricted 
1926 nil Sudan grain export restricted 
1927 nil Poor crops in Sudan which imports 
48,000 tons of grain 
1928 nil Exports restricted 
1929 nil Exports restricted 
1930 not avail. Trade opened, only small export 
1931 not avail. Small trade resumed 
1932 316 
1933 4,000 Most of large dura export to Egypt 
1934 517 
1935 6,588 Opening of Halo-Ethiopia war; 
Sanctions imposed 27 November on export 
of Sudan transport animals 
1936 20,168 Large-scale smuggling of talers 
in to Eritrea 
1937 15,505 Major movement of labor to Eritrea 
1938 16,375 Increased demand at end of year 
because of locust damage 
Source: Central Economics Board, Secretary's Annual Report, 1914-38. 
